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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ing individual privacy in varying degree.45 A magistrate will be
confronted with the issue of what probable cause standard to
use when a request for a warrant does not fit neatly into the
criminal search-administrative inspection dichotomy. Camara
could be read to establish a whole spectrum of probable cause
tests. Under this reading in each individual case a set of stand-
ards would be applicable based upon the degree of public interest
involved. Although this certainly was not the result intended
by the Court, its decision to establish the dual standard leaves
the magistrate considerable discretion as to the type of probable
cause test applicable to each warrant request.
Through a conscientious effort by the magistrates to main-
tain consistent restrictions upon the showing of probable cause
and responsible attitudes by the municipal agencies in seeking
out warrants only when necessitated by a refused entry, it is
possible to foresee satisfactory results without depreciating the
fourth amendment's overall protections under the Camara in-
spection warrant system. However, to avoid any potential abuse
of the fourth amendment's guarantees because of Camara's vague
guidelines, further delineation of the exact extent and limita-
tions of the new probable cause standard must be forthcoming.
Estoppel: Affirmative Use of a Judgment by a Nonparty
Plaintiff's truck, operated by his employee, collided with a
car owned and operated by defendamt. In a prior action, the
employee recovered a judgment against the defendant for per-
sonal injuries incurred in the collision. In the present action,
plaintiff-owner sued defendant for property damage to his truck.
The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the ground that
defendant's negligence had been conclusively determined in the
prior suit. The New York Court of Appeals granted the motion,
holding that the requirement of mutuality of estoppel, under
which a prior judgment may be asserted only by parties or privies
thereto, would no longer prevail in New York. B. R. DeWitt,
Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
Mutuality of estoppel is related to the broader doctrines of
45. A few examples of everyday invasions of privacy for which a
warrant might have to be sought if entry were refused are: a truant
officer seeking out a tardy pupil, conservation agents investigating pos-
sible game and fish violations, census takers or government agents




res judicata and collateral estoppel. Res judicata requires that
parties to an action not relitigate the same cause of action once
there has been an adjudication on the merits.1 Collateral estop-
pel is applicable to bar reconsideration of issues of fact or law
which were resolved in the first action when the later action is
based upon a different cause from that asserted in the first pro-
ceeding.2 The difference between the two principles is that res
judicata precludes a party from litigating all matters which
might have been determined in the former action, while col-
lateral estoppel operates only with respect to those issues actu-
ally raised and adjudicated in the prior action. 3 Thus, a party
must show that the issues as to which the collateral estoppel is
urged are identical with those raised and resolved in the first
action.4
Mutuality of estoppel is an additional requirement for the
assertion of a prior judgment as collateral estoppel. It demands
that a party seeking to assert a favorable prior judgment must
have been an actual participant in or privy5 to the judgment
such that he would have been bound by an adverse determina-
1. This doctrine is often subdivided into the principles of merger
and bar. If the judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the cause
of action is said to be merged into the judgment, and the plaintiff cannot
thereafter maintain a suit upon the original cause of action. If thejudgment is in favor of the defendant, the original cause of action is
said to be extinguished or barred by the judgment. See RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment a (1942).
2. Messing v. Barr Corp., 148 F. Supp. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1957);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, comment a (1942); Note, Collateral
Estoppel in New York, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158, 1160 (1961); Note, The
Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel
by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1012 (1967).
3. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1877); Erbe v.
Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 3 N.Y.2d 321, 327, 144 N.E.2d 78, 81, 165
N.Y.S.2d 107, 112 (1957); Ripley v. Storer, 309 N.Y. 506, 132 N.E.2d 87(1956); Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B & C Nieberg Realty Corp., 250
N.Y. 304, 307, 165 N.E. 456, 457 (1929); Application of Harris, 276
App. Div. 990, 991, 96 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92 (1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 752, 98
N.E.2d 884 (1951); Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 19 Misc. 2d 176,
180, 189 N.Y.S.2d 577, 582-83 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
4. See, e.g., Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence,
158 F. 63 (8th Cir. 1907); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d
813, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Good Health Dairy Corp. v. Emery, 275
N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
5. A privy within this rule is one who claims an interest in the
subject matter affected by the judgment through or under one of the
parties, e.g., by inheritance, succession, or purchase. This interest must
have been acquired before the rendition of judgment. See Sargent v.
New Haven Steamboat Co., 65 Conn. 116, 126, 31 A. 543, 547 (1894);
Womach v. City of St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S.W. 443 (1907); Taylor
v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 40, 108 S.W. 1089, 1094 (1908).
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tion.6 Similarly, a litigant, even if a party or privy to the first
action, may assert that judgment only against one who was a
party to the action.7 However, the justification for these two
conditions is not the same. A defendant who is a stranger to the
prior action is not bound adversely by the decision because due
process requires that he have his day in court on all the issues.8
But where a stranger seeks to assert a prior judgment against
one who was a party thereto, the due process objection loses its
force, provided that the issues are identical, since the defendant
has had his day in court. The courts, however, have traditionally
prohibited such use, simply because it is thought to be unfair to
hold an adversary to a judgment by which the stranger would
not be bound had the decision gone the other way.9
The mutuality requirement of collateral estoppel is of an-
cient origin, 10 and has generally been enforced by the courts."
Although the recent trend12 has been toward enlarging the
6. MacAffer v. Boston & M.R.R., 2613 N.Y. 400, 197 N.E. 328 (1935);
Potter v. Emerol Mfg. Co., 275 App. Div. 265, 89 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1949);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 41 (1942).
7. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934);
Elder v. New York & Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d
188 (1940); Haverhill v. International Ry., 217 App. Div. 521, 217
N.Y.S. 522 (1926); 1 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 428 (5th ed. 1925)
[hereinafter cited as FREEMAN].
8. See cases cited supra note 7.
9. Haverhill v. International Ry., 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S. 522(1926); FREEMAN § 407, at 887; Note, Coi.lateral Estoppel in New York,
36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158, 1165-66 (1961).
10. See CHAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RES JuTDIcATA 183
n.4 (1894).
11. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Cooper Mining & Smelting Co.,
225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912); Sayre v. Crews, 184 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950);
Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825
(1947); McVeigh v. McGurren, 117 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 573 (1941); Gilman v. Gilman, 115 Vt. 49, 51 A.2d 46 (1947);
Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Taylor, 164 Va. 103, 178 S.E. 772
(1935); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 94 comment a (1942).
12. The trend has undoubtedly been encouraged by continuing
criticism of the doctrine by commentators. Professor Currie viewed
the principle as a "tinkling cymbal, an empty and fatuous formula
productive of more harm than good." Currie, Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 322
(1957).
The debate over mutuality is found in numerous law review articles.
Opposing the doctrine, see Currie, supra at 281; Note, Collateral Es-
toppel, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 137 (1956); Note, Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppel, 27 VA. L. REv. 955 (1940).
For a defense of the mutuality rule see Moore & Currier, Mu-
tuality and the Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301 (1961);
Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 303-304 (1929); Seavey,
Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties Nor Privies-
[Vol. 52:768
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classes of persons who may take advantage of collateral estop-
pel,13 the mutuality doctrine ordinarily has been modified only
when strict adherence to the principle would clearly be unjust.
Thus, an exception to the requirement of mutuality has been
recognized in the derivative liability situation1 4 to avoid the
anomalous possibility of recovery against the party secondarily
liable after the person primarily liable has been exonerated.' 5
Some courts recognize another exception where a litigant seeks
to use a prior judgment defensively against one who was a party
to the first action.' 6 So long as the issues are identical, the plain-
tiff has already had his day in court on this matter, and public
policy demands that repetitious litigation be avoided in this
instance.17
Two California Cases, 57 HAv. L. REV. 98, 105 (1943); Note, Mutuality
in Collateral Estoppel: Never the Twain Shall Meet, 37 Miss. L.J.
244 (1966); Note, Res Judicata, 54 HARv. L. REv. 889 (1941); Com-
ment, 35 YALE L.J. 607, 611 (1926).
13. Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 F.
63 (8th Cir. 1907); King v. Stuart Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ga.
1943); Charles H. Duell, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Corp., 12 Cal.
App. 397, 17 P.2d 781 (1932); Carter v. Public Serv. Gas Co., 100 N.J.L.
374, 126 A. 456 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924); Griffin v. McBrayer, 252 N.C. 54,
112 S.E.2d 748 (1960); Brobston v. Darby, 290 Pa. 331, 138 A. 849 (1927).
14. Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 F.
63 (8th Cir. 1907); Good Health Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y.
14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 96-99 (1942);
Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral
Estoppel by a Non Party, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1015 (1967).
15. If the losing plaintiff in the first action were allowed to recover
from the indemnitee in the subsequent litigation, it would mean either
that the second defendant would lose his right of indemnity, or that the
indemnitor would be held liable to his indemnitee after he had been
exonerated from liability on the same claim by a valid judgment.
F. JAMES, CIrVI PROCEDURE § 11.32 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 96, comment a (1942).
16. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 813, 122 P.2d 892
(1942); Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934);
Good Health Dairy Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
17. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260
(1934) where the Coca-Cola company sued a dealer in soft drinks, al-
leging that the dealer had substituted Pepsi-Cola for Coca-Cola. The
court held that no substitution had taken place. In a subsequent action,
Coca-Cola sought a reward offered by Pepsi-Cola for information lead-
ing to the detection of any dealer substituting Pepsi-Cola for any other
soft drink. The dealer implicated by Coca-Cola's information was the
same as the party exonerated in the first suit. Since the issues were
identical in both suits and a recovery by the plaintiff in the second
action would be anomalous, the court permitted the defendant to assert
the prior judgment as collateral estoppel. The decision implicitly left
open the question of whether mutuality would be abandoned in cases
where collateral estoppel is asserted offensively. See Note, The Impacts
1968]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In DeWitt, the issue presented was identical to that in
the prior action.' 8 Therefore, the only objection to use of the
first action as collateral estoppel was lack of mutuality of es-
toppel. The court pointed out that although the general rule
in New York required mutuality except where the prior judg-
ment was asserted defensively, it had permitted affirmative use
of a prior judgment in certain instances.'9 The court could not
find any policy reason or precedent forbidding offensive use of
a prior judgment, on the ground that mutuality was lacking, in
any case where the issues were identical. Furthermore, the
court felt that the recognition of many exceptions to the rule
had so undermined its vitality as to require its complete aban-
donment. It noted that the primary concern in recent collateral
estoppel decisions was centered onl whether the issues were
identical and not any hypertechnical rule of mutuality. In light
of these decisions, the court stated, the time had come to abrogate
the doctrine of mutuality and make identity of issues the sole
determining factor in passing upon a plea of collateral estoppel.
Despite its attempt to characterize its opinion as the cul-
mination of a trend toward abandonment of mutuality, the
court's holding is a significant departure from, and an overrul-
ing of, prior New York law. It is true that the trend in New York
with respect to the mutuality doctrine has been to enlarge the
class of persons who may assert collateral estoppel.20  It is also
true that in a few isolated instances, New York had permitted the
offensive use of a prior judgment.2 1 However, the cases 22 that
of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Non
Party, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1019 (1967).
18. 19 N.Y.2d at 143, 225 N.E.2d at 197, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (1967).
19. In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Colon & Co., 260 N.Y. 305, 183 N.E.
506 (1932), plaintiff insurance company sued defendant for causing the
death of plaintiff's insured's employee. The court permitted plaintiff to
assert a prior judgment in which the widow of the deceased had re-
covered damages for wrongful death against the same defendant. See
also United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626 (1946).
20. See generally Good Health Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Emery, 275
N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937); Elder v. New York & Pa. Motor Express,
Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940); Note, Collateral Estoppel in New
York, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158 (1961).
21. See note 20 supra.
22. Cummings v. Dresler, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.
2d 976 (1966); Peare v. Griggs, 8 N.Y.2d 44, 167 N.E.2d 734, 201 N.Y.S.2d
326 (1960); Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d
126 (1959); Stratter v. Stratter, 2 N.Y.2d 668, 143 N.E.2d 10, 163 N.Y.S.2d
13 (1958); United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Saeli, 297 N.Y. 611, 75 N.E.2d 626
(1947); Good Health Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d




the court chose to treat as bridging decisions do not represent a
trend toward abandonment of the rule, but rather recognitions
of the generally accepted exceptions to it. In fact, one case 23
relied on by the court to illustrate the "trend" had been charac-
terized earlier as a case in which "no attempt was made . . . to
use it [the prior judgment] to establish liability affirmatively."24
While the court's use of precedent is questionable, its conclu-
sion that there is no policy justification for the mutuality rule is
sound. The only possible basis for requiring that both parties
must be privy to a prior judgment before it can be asserted by
one against the other as collateral estoppel is due process.25 But
as the court pointed out,26 if the issues in a later action are
identical with those of an earlier one, and the defendant has
litigated them fully, there is no violation of due process in allow-
ing the assertion of a prior judgment against him by a nonparty
to the earlier action. The defendant against whom the judgment
is asserted has had his day in court on these issues.
In some situations, however, customary notions of fairness,
if not due process, may be violated by permitting affirmative
use of a prior judgment by a nonparty. For example, if one
hundred and fifty stock purchasers, induced to purchase through
a fraudulent prospectus, each sued a defendant corporation
separately, 7 the defendant could not employ a favorable judg-
ment in the first action against the other plaintiffs.28 If, how-
ever, the twentieth plaintiff won his action, all future plaintiffs
could assert the judgment as collateral estoppel in subsequent
actions against the corporation, since the latter was a party to
the earlier litigation. Thus, while the abandonment of the mu-
tuality rule does not necessarily violate due process requirements,
it may raise serious questions of fairness.29
23. Good Health Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d
758 (1937).
24. Elder v. New York & Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 352,
31 N.E.2d 188, 190 (1940).
25. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 126, 172 A. 260,
262 (1934); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96(1), comment a at 473-
74 (1942).
26. 19 N.Y.2d at 145, 225 N.E.2d at 197, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (1967).
27. A similar illustration is posed in Currie, supra note 12, at 281.
28. The result is the same even with the abandonment of mu-
tuality, since the assertion of a judgment against a nonparty who has
never had his day in court will constitute a violation of due process.
29. In Note, Mutuality in Collateral Estoppel: Never the Twain
Shall Meet, 37 Mss. L.J. 244, 249-53 (1966), the author suggests a
solution to the multiple claimant problem. The party against whom thejudgment is asserted should be able to introduce evidence showing that
19681
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Also, any contention that the court's holding will decrease
litigation is questionable. While DeWitt illustrates that in some
instances abandonment of mutuality will decrease litigation, sit-
uations can arise where abrogation of the requirement may re-
sult in more rather than less litigation.30 Individuals who nor-
mally would not initiate an action, perhaps because their claims
are small and somewhat questionable, might be encouraged
to do so if they could rely upon a prior favorable judgment
obtained by someone else.3 '
Furthermore, the length and scope of a lawsuit will most
likely increase due to the abandonment of the mutuality require-
ment. Even when the cost is high and the claim is relatively
insignificant, a party will litigate to the utmost since an adverse
judgment will be available to an indeterminate number of persons
to assert collaterally against him. This problem is especially
acute since while the court indicated that the defendant must
have been afforded the opportunity to litigate with "full vigor"
in the first action, it did not offer guidelines as to what would
constitute "full vigor." Therefore the effect of default judgments
and actions for minimal damages is not clear.
32
The abolition of the mutuality rule leaves two considera-
tions for determining whether a plea of collateral estoppel should
be permitted: whether the issues are identical in both actions,
and whether the issues were litigated with full vigor by defend-
ant in the first action. Proper resolution of the identity of issues
question is especially important because now a defendant may
be deprived of his day in court both as to the issues and as to his
new adversary. Under prior law the defendant at least had an
opportunity to face each adversary once. Yet DeWitt provides
no guidelines for determining whether the issues are identical
even though the New York courts have found this question diffi-
cult to resolve in the past.33
he in fact did not litigate his claim fully in the prior suit. Under this
view, the jury and not the judge would decide whether the plea is
permissible. See also Note, Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Asser-
tion of Collateral Estoppel by a Non Party, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1010,
1036 (1967).
30. See Moore & Currier, supra note 12, at 309.
31. Id.; Note, Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Col-
lateral Estoppel by a Non Party, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1033 (1967).
32. Professor James points out that most consent and default judg-
ments are given no collateral estoppel effect. F. JAms, CIrVu PnocEWRmE
§ 11.31, at 596 n.6 (1965). But see Burke v. Hayden, 2 Misc. 2d 1040,
158 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1956), where a prior default judgment grant-
ing reinstatement in day labor work was held conclusive on the issue
of whether the initial appointment to the job was valid.
33. See People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v.
[Vol. 52:768
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Courts, of course, have had to determine which issues are
identical even when use of collateral estoppel demanded mutual-
ity. But, since the parties were the same in both cases, and the
same transaction was usually involved, the issues were relatively
well-defined. Now that a prior judgment may be used by an
indeterminate number of persons, the plea will be used more
often, with less likelihood of clear identity of issues. Unfortun-
ately, formulation of a detailed test of identity for application
in all cases is probably not feasible due to the variety of con-
texts in which a plea of collateral estoppel may be raised. More-
over, general tests, while at first glance appealing, have proven
unworkable in practice.3 4 Due to the danger of an abuse of due
process if the issues are not precisely identical in both actions, a
particularized comparison of the issues and the contexts in
which they arose will be necessary. 5
The holding in the instant case further complicates the task
of a judge faced with a plea of collateral estoppel by requiring
that the defendant have litigated the issues in the prior action
with "full vigor." Although the court provided no indication of
what it meant by this phrase, it would seem to require at least
Haring, 286 App. Div. 676, 146 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1955) (court held that a
prior judgment determining the issue that land was not devoted to
nontaxable use was distinct from the issue of present use); McQuade
v. Maidman, 207 Misc. 364, 137 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1955). But cf.
Murray, Inc. v. Fifth Madison Corp., 3 App. Div. 2d 430, 161 N.Y.S.2d
326 (1957), aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 932, 151 N.E.2d 357, 175 N.Y.S.2d 173
(1958). A prior determination of the relative values of space was
held to be conclusive absent proof of changed circumstances.
34. Judge Learned Hand suggested that collateral estoppel "be lim-
ited to future controversies which could be thought reasonably in pros-
pect when the first suit was tried." See Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d
927, 929 (2d Cir. 1944), discussed in Note, Impacts of Defensive and
Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Non Party, 35 GEo. WAsH.
L. REV. 1010, 1053 (1967). A recent law review comment offered the fol-
lowing test: Collateral estoppel should be limited "to a finding of fact
actually recognized by the parties as important and by the trier of fact
as necessary to the first judgment, if its significance for future litigation
was then reasonably foreseeable." Comment, 74 HAv. L. REV. 421,
423 (1960). Such vague and indefinite tests offer no aid to a court in
deciding upon a particular plea of collateral estoppel.
35. A difference in the contexts in which apparently identical is-
sues arise may be so significant that the issues are in fact not the same.
The following hypothetical situation illustrates this: wife sues husband
for separate maintenance on the ground that husband has a dangerous
temper, offering evidence of husband's temper by proving that hus-
band struck a neighbor's child. After a judgment in favor of the
wife is rendered, the neighbor's child sues the husband for assault and
battery. It is submitted that the difference in the contexts in the
two cases requires that the earlier judgment not be afforded collateral
estoppel effect.
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